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ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Will Pryor* 
“Y’know my heart keeps tellin’ me 
You’re not a kid at 33 
Y’play around y’lose your wife 
Y’play too long, y’lose your life . . . 
Some gotta win, 
Some gotta lose 
Good Time Charlie’s got the blues”1 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a field that invites parties to a 
dispute to pursue resolution outside the judicial process. Mediation, a non-
binding, informal ADR process facilitated by a neutral third-party, is sometimes 
referred to as a “win-win” opportunity, where the parties control the outcome of 
the dispute and negotiate an outcome that is acceptable, if not ideal. But in the 
form of ADR we refer to as binding arbitration, eventually there is a winner, and 
a loser—at least that is how it is supposed to work. As a consequence of a judicial 
narrowing in recent years regarding the grounds for setting aside or vacating 
arbitration awards, lawyers are searching high and low to find creative ways to 
achieve vacature. This year we have an active area of appellate activity, challenges 
to arbitration awards for “evident partiality,” and arguments that arbitrators 
“exceeded their power”.2 
This is the sixth installment of an Annual Survey chapter on ADR, the first 
installment being published in 2008.3 There can be no disputing that in the past 
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 1. DANNY O’KEEFE, Good Time Charlie’s Got The Blues, on O’KEEFE (Signpost Records 1972). 
 2. Fed. Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
 3. Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 61 SMU L. REV. 519 (2008). 
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six years mediation has continued to saturate the legal marketplace, and the use 
of arbitration throughout the state of Texas has skyrocketed—as has the controversy 
that surrounds it. Appellate decisions abound. In this survey piece we will examine 
a few of the more intriguing and important cases in ADR, particularly cases 
pertaining to arbitration. For the first time we will also examine the 
development of an ADR process unique to the insurance industry—the 
insurance appraisal process. 
I.  ARBITRATION 
Most appellate decisions addressing arbitration issues can be easily segregated 
into cases addressing the “front end”—whether an arbitration clause is 
enforceable and arbitration can be compelled against one party’s wishes, and 
cases addressing the “back end”—whether an award published by an arbitrator or 
arbitration panel should be confirmed or set aside. 
But much attention has been focused during the survey year on whether class 
action waivers in arbitration clauses are binding and enforceable, or whether 
courts or state statutes can invalidate them. This attention derives from two 
recent decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court. 
A.  CLASS ACTION WAIVERS 
The first is American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,4 decided in June 
2013. In an agreement between American Express and merchants accepting the 
American Express charge card, the binding arbitration clause provided that 
there “shall be no right or authority for any Claims to be arbitrated on a class 
action basis.”5 The merchants filed a class action, arguing that the cost of expert 
analysis of any individual merchant’s claim, relative to the amount recoverable 
by any single merchant, rendered pursuit of any individual claim impractical and 
meaningless.6 The Court held that the “[Federal Arbitration Act] does not 
permit courts to invalidate a contractual waiver of class arbitrations” based on an 
economic impracticality argument.7 Addressing the holding, one commentator 
noted, “If you sign an arbitration agreement that says you are waiving your right 
to class arbitration, that means you are waiving your right to class arbitration.”8 
Expect these waivers to become commonplace in all sorts of contracts. 
Only days earlier, the Court had published Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 
which affirmed an arbitrator’s decision that the arbitration clause at issue 
allowed for class action arbitrations.9 The issue for the Court was not whether 
the arbitrator’s interpretation of the provision was correct, but merely whether 
 
 4. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 5. Id. at 2306. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. David Garcia & Leo Caseria, Opinion analysis: A class action waiver in an arbitration 
agreement will be strictly enforced under the Federal Arbitration Act, SCOTUSBLOG (June 21, 2013, 
10:45 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/06/opinion-analysis-a-class-action-waiver-in-an-
arbitration-agreement-will-be-strictly-enforced-under-the-federal-arbitration-act/. 
 9. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013). 
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the arbitrator (even arguably) was interpreting the contract.10 The Court 
explicitly was not concerned with the correctness of the arbitrator’s decision, 
and all but stated that the decision was wrong. This deference to the decision of 
an arbitrator is consistent with the Court’s recent favorable view of binding 
arbitration.11 The opinion may have more importance with respect to judicial 
deference of arbitrator decision-making than to the issue of class action 
arbitration, in light of American Express. 
B.  VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: WHO DECIDES? 
In recent years, courts have wrestled with the preliminary question of who, 
the court or the arbitrator, should determine whether an arbitration agreement 
is enforceable, and what issues are included and excluded from the scope of the 
arbitration. As a general proposition, courts tend to give great deference to the 
authority of arbitrators, particularly when the arbitration agreement itself 
includes or incorporates a specific rule blessing the arbitrator with authority to 
decide these preliminary issues. 
This deference was highlighted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nitro-Lift 
Technologies, L.L.C. v. Eddie Lee Howard, where a claim was filed by oil field 
workers in Oklahoma attempting to set aside their non-compete agreements 
with their prior employer.12 The Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed the lower 
court and invalidated the non-compete agreements under Oklahoma law, 
enjoining their enforcement.13 The U.S. Supreme Court held this was an 
impermissible usurpation of the arbitrator’s authority because “it is for the 
arbitrator to decide in the first instance whether the covenants not to compete 
are valid as a matter of applicable state law.”14 
Texas appellate courts will usually reinforce the principle that the arbitrator 
makes the critical preliminary decision regarding arbitrability, assuming the 
arbitration agreement or relevant rules contain an appropriate expression of 
such authority.15 In the survey year, the best examples include Jones v. 
 
 10. Id. at 2071. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 133 S. Ct. 500, 501–02 (2013). 
 13. Id. at 502. 
 14. Id. at 504. 
 15. It is the prerogative of this writer to remind the reader that this “arbitrator decides” 
scheme is, according to many, illogical, to put it kindly. In his dissent in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), Justice Black responded to the majority’s holding that a 
federal court, in the context of a claim of “fraudulent inducement,” may consider only whether the 
claim is that the arbitration agreement itself was fraudulently induced, or whether the claims goes 
to the agreement as a whole. Id. at 398–402. 
The Court here holds that the [FAA] . . . compels a party to a contract containing a 
written arbitration provision to carry out his “arbitration agreement” even though a 
court might, after a fair trial, hold the entire contract—including the arbitration 
agreement—void because of fraud in the inducement. The Court holds, what is to me 
fantastic, that the legal issue of a contract’s voidness because of fraud is to be decided 
by persons designated to arbitrate factual controversies arising out of a valid contract 
between the parties. And the arbitrators who the Court holds are to adjudicate the 
legal validity of the contract need not even be lawyers . . .” 
Id. at 407 (Black, J. Dissenting) (emphasis added). By “fantastic” Justice Black did not mean 
“wonderful.” 
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Mainwaring,16 a case involving a contract between future homeowners and their 
architect. When the relationship went awry and the clients filed suit, the 
architect sought to compel arbitration pursuant to a straightforward arbitration 
clause in their agreement.17 The homeowners, however, contended that the 
Defendant was not a licensed architect at the time he entered into the 
agreement, and therefore lacked capacity, rendering the entire agreement 
unenforceable.18 Quoting well-settled Supreme Court authority, the court held 
that: 
regardless of whether the challenge is brought in federal or state court, a 
challenge to the validity of a contract as a whole, and . . . not specifically its 
arbitration provisions, those provisions are enforceable apart from the 
remainder of the contract. The challenge should therefore be considered 
by an arbitrator, not a court.19 
“[T]he issue presented in this appeal is who properly decides the issue of 
arbitrability against a non-signatory—the trial court or the arbitrator,” wrote the 
Houston Court of Appeals in Elgohary v. Herrera.20 Seemingly at odds with the 
opinion just discussed, the court concluded that “[b]ecause the trial court, not 
the arbitrator, should have decided the ‘gateway issue’ of whether Herrera had 
agreed to be bound by the arbitration, the arbitrator exceeded his authority.”21 
Is there an inconsistency in these opinions? Perhaps. But in the Elgohary case, 
the clause at issue was in a contract signed by Gilbert Herrera, a limited partner 
in a Texas limited partnership, signing in his capacity as president of the limited 
partnership.22 Herrera, individually, was a non-signatory to the agreement.23 
Consequently, it could not be shown that Herrara, individually, “clearly and 
unmistakably agreed” to submit claims against him personally to arbitration,24 a 
standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. 
Kaplan.25 
Consider this scenario. Plaintiff files a suit, which is followed by the 
defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiff files a motion to compel 
limited discovery, a one hour deposition, to explore the issue of validity or non-
 
 16. Jones v. Mainwaring, No. 09-12-00324, 2012 WL 6643849, at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 
Dec. 20, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at *3 (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 446, 449 
(2006) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 20. Elgohary v. Herrera, 405 S.W.3d 785, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.). 
 21. Id. at 793. 
 22. Id. at 788. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 790. 
 25. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 934, 944 (1995). Opinions can be 
found in which appellate courts, somewhat inexplicably, seem to wander off into analysis of 
arbitrability, under circumstances where it appears they should have been delegating such a 
decision to the arbitrator. It would be reassuring if they would at least acknowledge the issue, and 
perhaps refer to the “clearly and unmistakably” standard. See Jones v. Villareal, No. 13-12-00166-
CV, 2013 WL 656839, at *7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Feb. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); 
Baumeister v. Reagan, Nos. 02-12-00276-CV, 02-12-00277-CV, 2013 WL 530976, at *5–6 (Tex. 
App.—Fort Worth Feb. 14, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
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validity of the arbitration clause. Sound reasonable? Not according to the El 
Paso Court of Appeals in In re ReadyOne Industries, Inc.26 
ReadyOne[, the Defendant,] contends that the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering limited discovery before ruling on the merits of 
ReadyOne’s motion to compel arbitration because Flores[, the Plaintiff,] 
failed to raise a colorable basis or reason to believe that discovery was 
necessary or would reveal that the arbitration agreement was 
unenforceable. We agree.27 
The ruling is clear, but authority also exists for the proposition that the 
“colorable basis” or “reason to believe” standard is irrelevant.28 The prevailing 
rule is that a motion to compel arbitration trumps all other pending motions 
and proceedings, and must receive priority.29 
C.  VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
In Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Systems, L.L.C., the Texas 
Supreme Court found that where an employment agreement did not include an 
arbitration clause, but an asset-purchase agreement between the same parties 
signed on the same day provided for arbitration, a dispute involving both 
agreements was arbitrable.30 Regrettably, the result seems dictated by a 
mysterious “throwing in of the towel” by the party that had succeeded in 
persuading the court of appeals that only the employment agreement was at 
issue, negating the obligation to arbitrate, and resulting in the short, per curiam 
decision.31 
Most decisions addressing challenges to the enforceability of an arbitration 
clause will recite, “In evaluating a motion to compel arbitration, a court must 
determine first whether a valid agreement exists, and then whether the 
agreement encompasses the claims raised.”32 In Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, in 
a dispute between the satellite television services provider and a former customer 
service representative, the former employee challenged the arbitration on the 
grounds that it was an agreement between him and a corporate parent of his 
employer.33 The court determined that the agreement was valid, was not illusory, 
did not lack consideration, and did not require Dish Network’s signature on the 
agreement to make it valid.34 
 
 26. In re ReadyOne Industries, Inc., 400 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). 
 27. Id. at 168. 
 28. See, e.g., In re Houston Pipe Line Co., 311 S.W.3d 449, 451 (Tex. 2009). 
 29. See In re Champion Technologies, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 595, 599 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2005, 
no pet.); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021 (West 2012). 
 30. Richmont Holdings, Inc. v. Superior Recharge Sys., L.L.C., 392 S.W.3d 633, 634–35 
(Tex. 2013). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Dish Network L.L.C. v. Brenner, Nos. 13-12-00564-CV, 13-12-00620-CV, 2013 WL 
3326640, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 27, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re D. 
Wilson Constr. Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 781 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 33. Id. at *7. 
 34. Id. at *4–6. 
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While on the subject of non-signatories, it seems almost paradoxical that 
some judicial decisions every year address circumstances in which one party 
wants to compel non-signatory parties to participate in arbitration, and other 
circumstances in which it is the non-signatories who want to be included in an 
arbitration process. It is not unusual for these battles to occur in the context of 
construction disputes, which almost inherently involve multiple parties, where 
some of the parties will have a signed arbitration agreement and some have not. 
In one such case decided during this survey year, a condominium owner filed 
suit against an architect, a general contractor, several sub-contractors, insurance 
provider, and insurance broker for damages to the condominium incurred 
during a hurricane.35 After a considerable amount of procedural jockeying and 
motion practice, including the entry of an agreed discovery control plan and 
scheduling order, the general contractor filed a motion to compel arbitration 
and to stay the litigation.36 All of the other parties, though non-signatories, 
joined in the motion.37 Interestingly,  
Sapphire[, the property owner,] argued that it did not have a written 
contract with any of the appellants, except for GTL[, the general 
contractor,] and that its contract with GTL “specifically provide[d] that 
there are no third party beneficiaries and that non-signatories to the 
contract [could not] claim any rights under its terms, including the right to 
arbitrate.”38  
Finding the arbitration agreement with GTL valid, the court nonetheless 
concluded that arbitration was not required because the demand for arbitration 
was outside a limitations restriction to which the parties had also agreed.39 As 
for the non-signatories, the court relied upon a specific section of the GTL 
contract which “merely allows for the consolidation or the joinder of third-parties 
in the arbitration proceeding. It does not give non-signatories a right to compel 
arbitration.”40 
Perhaps of narrow interest, but still important to many, the Texas Supreme 
Court took up the issue of a “donative arbitration clause,” a clause in an inter 
vivos trust.41 In a dispute between a trust beneficiary and the trustee, should 
arbitration be compelled? This issue is surfacing for the first time in other state 
courts and other state legislatures, and the Texas Supreme Court’s decision 
seems to follow a recent trend: 
Reitz’s[, the beneficiary’s,] assent to the trust is reflected in his acceptance 
of the benefits of the trust and his suit to compel the trustee to comply 
with the trust’s terms. Reitz’s claims that Rachal[, the trustee,] violated the 
terms of the trust are within the scope of the arbitration provision, which 
 
 35. G.T. Leach Builders, L.L.C. v. Sapphire V.P., L.P., No. 13-11-00793-CV, 2013 WL 
2298447, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi May 23, 2013, pet. filed) (mem op.). 
 36. Id. at *1–2. 
 37. Id. at *2. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at *6. 
 40. Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
 41. See Will Pryor, Alternative Dispute Resolution, 65 SMU L. REV. 247, 259 (2012). 
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requires the arbitration of “any dispute of any kind involving this Trust.” 
Thus, Rachal carried his burden of demonstrating that the trust contains a 
valid arbitration agreement that covers Reitz’s claims.42 
Having discussed the threshold issues of validity and “who chooses,” we move 
on to defenses to otherwise valid arbitration agreements. By far the most 
discussed defense is waiver, specifically the notion that when one party 
“substantially invokes judicial process,” the party may be deemed to have waived 
their opportunity to arbitrate. Since the infamous Perry Homes v. Cull decision by 
the Texas Supreme Court in 2008, many cases have addressed the issue.43 
In Baty v. Bowen, Miclette & Britt Inc., the Houston 14th Court of Appeals 
summarized the waiver factors set forth in Perry Homes as follows: 
[W]hether the party who pursued arbitration was the plaintiff or the 
defendant; how long the party who pursued arbitration delayed before 
seeking arbitration; when the party who pursued arbitration learned of the 
arbitration clause’s existence; how much the pretrial activity related to the 
merits rather than arbitrability or jurisdiction; how much time and expense 
has been incurred in litigation; whether the party who pursued arbitration 
sought or opposed arbitration earlier in the case; whether the party who 
pursued arbitration filed affirmative claims or dispositive motions; how 
much discovery has been conducted and who initiated the discovery; 
whether the discovery sought would be useful in arbitration; what discovery 
would be unavailable in arbitration; whether activity in court would be 
duplicated in arbitration; when the case was to be tried; and whether the 
party who pursued arbitration sought judgment on the merits.44 
Applying these factors to a dispute between a former employee of a 
corporation and the corporation, the court observed: 
The Supreme Court of Texas has instructed that in a close case we should 
conclude that the heavy burden of showing waiver of arbitration has not 
been satisfied. Therefore, in this close case, we conclude that the trial court 
did not err by impliedly finding that the [corporation] did not waive their 
rights to arbitration.45 
How close were the circumstances? Although the corporation included a request 
to arbitrate in its original answer to the lawsuit, it did not file a motion to 
compel arbitration for eight months.46 In the meantime, the defendants filed 
numerous affirmative counterclaims, requested a temporary restraining order 
and injunctive relief—though these requests were never set for hearing—and 
 
 42. Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840, 851 (Tex. 2013); see Pryor, supra note 41 (discussing 
Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011) rev’d, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013). 
 43. See Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580 (Tex. 2008). See discussion at Will Pryor, 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 SMU L. REV. 843, 845–48 (2009). 
 44. Baty v. Bowen, Miclette & Britt, Inc., No. 14-11-00663-CV, 2013 WL 2253584, at *4–5 
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] May 23, 2013, pet. denied) (citing Perry Homes, 258 S.W.3d at 
591–92). 
 45. Id. at *12. 
 46. Id. at *2. 
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engaged in “significant” discovery.47 
In similar fashion, in a dispute between a borrower and guarantor against a 
lender, the court in Paul Jacobs, P.C. v. Encore Bank, N.A. found that no waiver by 
substantially invoking judicial process had occurred.48 What were the 
circumstances deemed to not constitute waiver? The borrower, though aware of 
the arbitration clause from the time suit was filed, waited eight months to 
demand arbitration.49 During this period, the lender’s first summary judgment 
on the merits was granted, and the second motion for summary judgment was 
filed.50 In addition, the borrower asserted counterclaims and third-party claims, 
responded to the lender’s first motion for summary judgment on the merits, and 
filed a motion for a new trial after the court’s unfavorable ruling on the motion 
for summary judgment.51 A respectable argument could be made that this case 
was wrongly decided. 
But we do have a case where waiver by substantially invoking judicial process 
was found.52 In Ellman v. JC General Contractors, an ophthalmologist got into a 
dispute with the contractor hired to build his new clinic and surgical center in 
El Paso.53 The court found waiver where, after being sued by his contractor, the 
physician waited almost three years to demand arbitration.54 In the interim, the 
physician filed counterclaims, engaged in substantial and extensive discovery on 
the merits, filed a joint motion for continuance followed by more discovery, and 
otherwise adhered to the court’s scheduling order for many months.55 The 
motion to compel arbitration was filed less than three months before the second 
trial setting.56 The waiver circumstances in this case seem clear and the result 
somewhat obvious, but if you have trouble reconciling recent cases that discuss 
waiver by substantially invoking judicial process, you are not alone. 
D.  VALIDITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT: UNCONSCIONABILITY? 
Once we have determined that an arbitration agreement exists, the dispute 
falls within the agreement, and there has been no waiver of the agreement by the 
parties, must the parties arbitrate their dispute? Not if the agreement is 
procedurally or substantively unconscionable. 
We have three opinions in which arbitration agreements were deemed 
unconscionable. Briefly summarized, these opinions are: 
(1) Venture Cotton Cooperative v. Freeman, in which a group of cotton 
farmers entered into an agreement with a shipper that incorporated 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Paul Jacobs P.C. v. Encore Bank, N.A., No. 01-12-00699-CV, 2013 WL 3467197, at *1, *5 
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 9, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 49. Id. at *3. 
 50. Id. at *2. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See Ellman v. JC Gen. Contractors, No. 08-12-00029-CV, 2013 WL 5741411, at *4 (Tex. 
App.—El Paso Oct. 23, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 53. Id. at *1. 
 54. Id. at *4. 
 55. Id. at *1. 
 56. Id. 
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the arbitration rules of the American Cotton Shippers Association.57 
Unfortunately, these rules allowed for the recovery of attorney’s fees 
by the shipper on a claim of breach of contract, but eliminated the 
farmer’s similar statutory right to such fees; consequently, the 
agreement was one-sided, sought to eliminate a statutory remedy, 
and was substantively unconscionable.58 
(2) Delfingen US-Texas, L.P. v. Valenzuela, in which a temporary employee 
who could not read English was required as a condition of her 
employment to sign several documents, one of which included an 
arbitration clause.59 Even though her “illiteracy in English is 
insufficient to establish that the Agreement is unconscionable,”60 the 
totality of the circumstances in which her signature on the document 
was secured resulted in a determination that the arbitration 
agreement was procedurally unconscionable.61 
(3) Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams v. Lopez involved a contract 
between a law firm and a client.62 “Agreements to arbitrate disputes 
between attorneys and clients are generally enforceable under Texas 
law”;63 in this case, however, “we conclude that the specific 
agreement before the Court is so one-sided that it is unconscionable 
under the circumstances.”64 The one-sided feature that offended the 
court was that the agreement reserved the law firm’s right to litigate 
its claims against the client but obligated the client to arbitrate his 
claims against the firm.65 
E.  THE BACK END: DID THE ARBITRATORS “EXCEED THEIR AUTHORITY”? 
According to the Fifth Circuit, the broad authority of arbitrators may include 
an inherent power to impose sanctions. In Hamstein Cumberland Music Group v. 
Estate of Williams,66 an arbitrator awarded a music publisher certain royalties 
against the estate of a songwriter and recording artist. The award far exceeded 
the actual damages incurred by including $500,000 as a sanction for non-
compliance with ordered discovery obligations.67 The Respondent argued that 
the arbitrator was not empowered to issue sanctions and therefore exceeded the 
authority granted by Section 10(a)(4) of the Federal Arbitration Act.68 
 
 57. Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 395 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, pet. 
granted). 
 58. Id. at 276. 
 59. Delfingen US-Tex., L.P. v. Valenzuela, 407 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no 
pet.). 
 60. Id. at 801. 
 61. Id. at 803. 
 62. Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, L.L.P. v. Lopez, Nos. 13-11-00757-CV, 13-12-0023-
CV, 2013 WL 3226847, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi June 27, 2013, pet. filed) (mem. op.). 
 63. Id. at *6. 
 64. Id. at *8. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Hamstein Cumberland Music Grp. v. Estate of Williams, 532 Fed. App’x 538, 544 (5th 
Cir. 2013). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 543. 
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Disagreeing with this conclusion, the court found that, “First, arbitrators enjoy 
inherent authority to police the arbitration process and fashion appropriate 
remedies to effectuate this authority, including with respect to conducting 
discovery and sanctioning failure to abide by ordered disclosures.”69 Holding 
that the scope of an arbitrator’s authority is not limited to the arbitration 
agreement, the Fifth Circuit viewed the sanctioned party’s own cross-motion for 
sanctions as conduct conferring the power on an arbitrator to order sanctions—
almost an estoppel argument.70 
By the time the arbitration of a non-compete dispute could be concluded, the 
twelve-month restrictive period on conduct of the departed employees had 
expired. This apparently frustrated the arbitrator, who found that the departed 
employees had breached the agreement but the former employer had not 
suffered monetary damages. 
In Nationsbuilders Insurance Services, Inc. v. Houston International Insurance 
Group, Ltd., the arbitrator determined that the former employer should “be 
restored the benefit of the bargain it made pursuant to the May 4, 2011 
Settlement Agreement,” and concluded that “Delaware law supported an 
equitable extension of the restrictive period.”71 The arbitrator awarded the 
former employer a twelve-month extension of the restrictions on the departed 
employees.72 In the past, the challenge might have been phrased as one of 
“manifest disregard of the law,” but these days and in this opinion the departed 
employees argued that the arbitrator “exceeded his powers.”73 Finding that the 
equitable extension of the restricted period was within the powers of the 
arbitrator, the court noted that the remedy “drew its essence” from the parties’ 
agreement.74 
The Dallas Court of Appeals also rejected an argument that an arbitration 
panel exceeded their powers.75 In Cambridge Legacy Group, Inc. v. Jain, the 
arbitrators awarded the claimant in a FINRA action compensatory damages and 
attorney’s fees.76 On appeal, the respondent argued that the arbitrators 
impermissibly subsumed claims the claimant could have brought against 
respondent’s wholly owned subsidiaries.77 When the issue came up during the 
arbitration hearing, “the arbitration panel denied [respondent’s] motion to 
dismiss and stated they would continue on with the arbitration hearing as if all 
three companies were in the same group under the same claim.”78 The court was 
persuaded that the broad language of the arbitration agreement (“all related 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Nationsbuilders Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Houston Int’l Ins. Grp. Ltd., No. 05-12-01103-CV, 
2013 WL 3423755, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at *4 (referring to a standard set out in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car 
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)). 
 75. Cambridge Legacy Grp., Inc. v. Jain, 407 S.W.3d 443 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. 
denied). 
 76. Id. at 447. 
 77. Id. at 449. 
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crossclaims, counterclaims, and/or third-party claims which may be asserted”), as 
well as FINRA by-laws, rules, and code of arbitration procedure, captured the 
broad claims set out in the arbitration proceeding.79 
F.  THE BACK END: DISCLOSURES AND “EVIDENT PARTIALITY” 
The standards available for setting aside arbitration awards (vacature) have 
narrowed, making vacature more and more unlikely for reasons such as 
“manifest disregard of the law” or even “exceeded authority.” The “hail Mary” 
challenge now appears to be the challenge of “evident partiality,” most often a 
discussion of whether an arbitrator failed to disclose circumstances creating a 
conflict of interest, or giving rise to even the appearance of a conflict. A new line 
of authority is emerging in favor of placing a greater burden on the parties to 
reasonably investigate an arbitrator’s potential conflicts. 
In Dealer Computer Services v. Michael Motor Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals overruled a District Court ruling that had vacated an arbitration award 
in favor of Dealer Computer Services (DCS) on the grounds of “evident 
partiality.”80 In the underlying AAA arbitration, DCS appointed as arbitrator 
Ms. Carol Butner.81 Ms. Butner made various disclosures under the AAA’s 
rules.82 After the panel ruled unanimously in favor of DCS, the losing party 
(MMC) argued that Ms. Butner’s disclosures were inadequate, particularly her 
failure to disclose her service in a prior arbitration involving DCS and similar 
contract issues.83 DCS countered that MMC had waived its right to object 
because it failed to raise its objection at any time prior to publication of the 
award.84 “A party seeking to vacate an arbitration award based on an arbitrator’s 
evident partiality generally must object during the arbitration proceedings.”85 
Reversing the district court and confirming the arbitration award, the court 
relied on the following circumstances to support its conclusion that MMC 
waived its right to object: 
Ms. Butner completed and filed her Acceptance of Party-Appointed 
Arbitrator questionnaire; 
The questionnaire had a box checked by Ms. Butner next to the statement: 
“I HEREBY DISCLOSE THE FOLLOWING;” 
Ms. Butner also checked a box that stated: “SEE DISCLOSURE DATED 
MAY 23, 2008”; 
In the disclosure memorandum, Ms. Butner specifically referred to the 
prior arbitration involving DCS; 
 
 79. Id. at 450. 
 80. Dealer Computer Serv. v. Michael Motor Co., 485 Fed. App’x. 724, 725 (5th Cir. 2012), 
cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 945 (2013). 
 81. Id. at 726. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 727. 
 85. Id. 
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Ms. Butner checked the “YES” box next to the question: “[h]ave any of the 
party representatives, law firms, or parties appeared before you in past 
arbitration cases.”86 
“Particularly in light of MMC’s duty to reasonably investigate, Butner’s 
disclosures were sufficient to put MMC on notice.”87 
Expect more cases to address the duty of counsel and the parties to investigate 
evidence of evident partiality. The duty to investigate appears to be emerging as 
a sort of common sense or rule of reason solution to a “gotcha’” problem. The 
court in Dealer Computer Services did not address whether Ms. Butner’s prior 
service in a similar case involving DCS would presumptively have disqualified 
her, but disclosure can cure a lot of ills. Arbitrators, often reluctant to provide 
too much detail about involvement in other proceedings that may have been 
private and confidential, should consider providing at least enough information 
to allow a party to seek further information, if requested. When in doubt, 
disclose. 
Whether the arbitrator was reluctant or whether the law firm appointing him 
to an arbitration panel guided his disclosures is part of the murky record in 
Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, in which a $125,000,000 
arbitration award—vacated by a trial court—was reinstated in an opinion by the 
Dallas Court of Appeals.88 It would not be surprising if the Texas Supreme 
Court, which has accepted a petition for review in this case, sides with the trial 
court and vacates the award. While the arbitrator’s disclosures reference his 
prior involvement in other matters with the law firm, the record included 
disturbing evidence that the law firm assisted in editing the disclosures, and the 
disclosures appear to have deliberately downplayed the prior contacts.89 In 
addition, once the party-appointed arbitrators engaged in the task of designating 
a third arbitrator, “Stern[, the arbitrator appointed by lawyers Penski and 
Boland,] communicated with both Penski and Boland about who should serve 
as the third arbitrator. In these communications, Stern referred to [Penski and 
Boland’s client] as ‘we’ and ‘us’ and referred to [the other party] as 
‘opponents’”.90 This opinion has the potential to truly shift the burden of 
arbitrator disclosures from the arbitrator to the parties. Quoting the Ninth 
Circuit: “If arbitration is to work, it must not be subjected to undue judicial 
interference. Moreover, parties must be encouraged, nay required, to raise their 
complaints about the arbitration during the arbitration process itself, when that 
is possible.”91 
 
 86. Id. at 728. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Ponderosa Pine Energy, LLC v. Tenaska Energy, 376 S.W.3d 358, 360 (Tex. App.—Dallas 
2012, pet. granted). 
 89. Id. at 364. 
 90. Id. at 365. 
 91. Id. at 376 (quoting Marino v. Writers Guild of Am. E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 
1993)). 
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II.  MEDIATION 
A.  ENFORCEABILITY OF MSAS 
There are very few windows of opportunity for appellate courts to review any 
issue pertaining to mediation. As always, given the informality and lack of 
structure of the mediation process, this is as it should be. But in the survey year 
several appellate courts turned their attention to the enforcement of mediated 
settlement agreements (MSAs). 
No opinion of the Texas Supreme Court has ever devoted as much attention 
to the enforceability of an MSA as the opinion of In re Stephanie Lee.92 Though 
specifically discussed within the context of the Texas Family Code, the analysis 
should be of interest to all. 
The Texas Family Code provides that, “[i]f a mediated settlement agreement 
meets [certain requirements], a party is entitled to judgment on the mediated 
settlement agreement notwithstanding . . . another rule of law.”93 The Court 
summarized its task as follows: 
We are called upon today to determine whether a trial court abuses its 
discretion in refusing to enter judgment on a statutorily compliant 
mediated settlement agreement (MSA) based on an inquiry into whether 
the MSA was in a child’s best interest. We hold that this language means 
what it says: a trial court may not deny a motion to enter judgment on a 
properly executed MSA on such grounds.94 
In Lee, the MSA included the following in boldfaced, capitalized, and 
underlined letters: “THE PARTIES ALSO AGREE THAT THIS MEDIATION 
AGREEMENT IS BINDING ON BOTH OF THEM AND IS NOT SUBJECT 
TO REVOCATION BY EITHER OF THEM.”95 In the face of a lengthy 
dissent, the majority held: “Because the MSA in this case meets the Family 
Code’s requirements for a binding agreement, and because neither party was a 
victim of family violence, we hold that the trial court abused its discretion by 
denying the motion to enter judgment on the MSA.”96 Though obviously 
decided with strict reference to the Texas Family Code, the opinion reflects a 
philosophy that MSAs should be respected and enforced. 
That the enforceability of MSAs may be an appellate topic in future cases is 
foreshadowed by Cisnado v. Shady Oak Estate Homeowner’s Association, where in a 
standard MSA, the parties agreed to perform certain post-mediation actions: 
issue payment of settlement proceeds, forward final settlement documents, and 
execute and file releases pursuant to an agreed order of dismissal.97 But plaintiffs 
failed to perform their obligations under the MSA, and instead sent opposing 
counsel notice that they wished to rescind the agreement and return to 
 
 92. In re Stephanie Lee, 411 S.W.3d 445 (Tex. 2013). 
 93. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 153.0071(e) (West 2008). 
 94. Lee, 411 S.W.3d at 447. 
 95. Id. at 448. 
 96. Id. at 461. 
 97. Cisnado v. Shady Oak Estate Homeowner’s Ass’n, No. 14-12-00028-CV, 2013 WL 
151624, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 15, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
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mediation.98 Finding that the plaintiffs had failed to attempt to mandamus the 
trial court’s entry of orders incorporating the MSA, the plaintiffs failed to 
preserve an opportunity to challenge the MSA.99 Although the opinion is 
decided on procedural grounds, it can be cited as authority for the proposition 
that MSAs are binding and enforceable contracts. 
Levetz v. Sutton is an intriguing case in which a trial court was found to have 
erred in granting a motion to enforce an MSA.100 This is a rare outcome, 
indeed. The facts are complicated, and the outcome was the result of a trial 
court hearing on the single issue of whether one of the parties had capacity to 
enter into a binding agreement—she alleged that her fibromyalgia, coupled with 
sleep deprivation and her medications, resulted in a lack of capacity.101 The 
Court of Appeals determined that the trial court should have also addressed on 
an evidentiary basis the alleged breach of the MSA, and therefore returned the 
matter for further consideration.102 
As in the opinion just discussed, there was an MSA between siblings who 
engaged in a dispute following the death of a parent, but this claim for breach of 
the MSA was submitted to a jury! In McDonald v. Fox, the court was not 
persuaded that the mere initials of a party’s counsel to a deletion in the MSA of 
a particular recipient of life insurance proceeds did not bind the party to the 
MSA.103 “There was other evidence that all parties, including McDonald, were 
aware of the deletion before the end of the mediation.”104 Part of this author’s 
fascination with this opinion is the rarity of appellate decisions that address 
communication that occurred during mediation.105 The opinion is not 
remarkable in any respect other than that it actually addresses issues such as a 
suggestion that the court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the 
mediator’s report to the court.106 
B.  SHAME, SHAME, SHAME 
Should you and your client not adhere to an order by the Fort Worth Court 
of Appeals to mediate, you can be scolded. The per curiam decision in 
Applewhite v. Applewhite is fascinating: 
 
 98. Id. at *2. 
 99. Id. at *6; see also Gen. Metal Fabricating Corp. v. Stergiou, No. 01-11-00460-CV, 2013 WL 
5228494, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013) (mem. op.) (providing an excellent analysis, 
not of an MSA, but of a Rule 11 settlement agreement which, like most MSAs, expressly 
contemplates the execution of more elaborate settlement documents; the Rule 11 agreement was 
deemed binding and enforceable where the details of the subsequent detailed documentation 
required to consummate the settlement did not have the same “foundational” importance to the 
underlying dispute as the “essential terms” agreed to by the parties.). 
 100. Levetz v. Sutton, 404 S.W.3d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 806. 
 103. McDonald v. Fox, No. 13-11-00479-CV, 2012 WL 5591795, at *10 (Tex. App.—San 
Antonio Nov. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). 
 104. Id. at *8. 
 105. See id. at *7. 
 106. Id. at *9. (“I am pleased to announce that the parties have entered into a settlement of the 
case. . . .”). 
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[I]t is disturbing and regretful that the parties have apparently defied this 
court’s order to mediate this appeal. While we are not privy to the details 
of what has transpired, the parties have utterly wasted not only their own 
time and resources but those of this court and the mediator, who had 
graciously agreed to mediate this appeal at cost. . . . [O]ur system of justice 
is dependent upon parties and their attorneys abiding by court orders, 
including those court orders that command the parties to schedule and 
attend a mediation and not meaningless “squabbling.” Though we are 
tempted to issue further orders requiring the parties to comply with this 
court’s previous orders, it is apparent from what has already transpired that 
doing so would only further waste time and resources.107 
C.  THE SKY WAS NOT FALLING (OR WAS IT?): THE CHANGE TO RULE 169 
The survey year saw a rare and exciting public dispute over an amendment to 
the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This survey chapter on ADR is traditionally 
limited to a discussion of appellate cases and the judiciary’s impact on how the 
practice of ADR in a survey year has changed. But stepping back a bit, on May 
25, 2011, the Texas legislature required that the Supreme Court of Texas adopt 
rules “to promote the prompt, efficient, and cost-effective resolution of civil 
actions,” particularly actions in which the claim, all inclusive, did not exceed 
$100,000.108 The Supreme Court appointed a Task Force.109 The Task Force 
proposals were referred to the Supreme Court Advisory Committee.110 On 
November 13, 2012, the Court proposed new rules and changes.111 All hell 
broke loose in the mediation community, as many felt the landscape of 
mediation was shifting.112 
The initial proposal removed the discretion to refer certain claims to ADR, 
which has been granted to all courts in Texas since the passage of the Texas 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures Act in 1987.113 The ADR 
community rose up and protested.114 The final rule allows the parties to agree to 
not engage in mediation—which courts previously could ignore—but absent such 
agreement the parties can be ordered to mediate for no more than a half-day, for 
a mediation fee not to exceed twice the amount of the filing fee.115 Whether this 
 
 107. Applewhite v. Applewhite, No. 02-12-00445-CV (158th Dist. Ct., Denton County., Tex. 
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9193 (Tex. Sept. 26, 2011). 
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 111. Order of Adoption of Rules for Dismissals and Expedited Cases, Misc. Docket No. 12-
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 114. See Morris, supra note 112. 
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new rule alters the mediation landscape remains to be seen, but the fury with 
which the initial proposal was met is a clear indication that the mediation 
community has become a self-aware community, interested in preserving 
mediation as a commercial enterprise. 
It has been pointed out that the 1987 statute was passed during an era of 
concern that our civil justice system was collapsing, ineffective, irrelevant, and 
broken. So after a quarter of a century of “mediation every where, all the time,” 
where are we? 
The Texas ADR act has been remarkably effective in providing litigants and 
courts an earlier, institutionalized method of settlement: the court-ordered, 
timely use of a trained settlement expert, mediator or other neutral. It is unclear, 
however, whether the actual rate of settlement has increased since 1987. No known 
research exists in Texas to support such a claim.116 
III.  INSURANCE APPRAISALS 
Wind and hail and other weather events can wreak havoc on commercial and 
residential property. In this survey year, due a surge in activity in this area, it 
seems appropriate to call attention to an ADR procedure unique to property 
damage insurance claims: the appraisal process. 
Appraisal clauses in insurance agreements provide a process for resolving 
disputes about a property’s value or the amount of a covered loss.117 Typically 
the clause resembles the following: 
If we and you disagree on the amount of loss, either may make written 
demand for an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will select a 
competent and impartial appraiser and notify the other of the appraiser 
with 20 days of such demand. The two appraisers will select an umpire. If 
they cannot agree within 15 days upon such umpire, either may request 
that selection be made by a judge of a court having jurisdiction. Each 
appraiser will state separately the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they 
will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two 
will be binding as to the amount of loss.118 
In theory appraisal clauses are sensible and intuitive. Should the insured and 
insurer fail to agree—in the context of a covered claim—about the amount of the 
loss or value of the property, the appraisal provides a relatively efficient method 
for turning the decision over to knowledgeable tradesmen, eliminating the need 
for lawyers, lawsuits, experts, and trials. But in practice, controversy abounds. 
There was very little controversy involving appraisals until the Texas Supreme 
Court decided State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson in 2009.119 Appraisals were to 
 
 116. Frank A. Elliott & Kay Elkins Elliott, Exciting Expedited Innovations: Whose Needs Matter 
More?, ALTERNATIVE RESOLUTIONS, Summer 2013, at 27. This article is an excellent history and 
analysis of the Rule 169 debacle. 
 117. In re Universal Underwriters of Tex. Ins. Co., 345 S.W.3d 404, 405 (Tex. 2011). 
 118. In re Pub. Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 03-13-00003-CV, 2013WL 692441, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Austin Feb. 21, 2013, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]). 
 119. State Farm Lloyds v. Johnson, 290 S.W.3d 886 (Tex. 2009). 
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determine the amount of loss, not coverage or liability.120 In a perfect violation 
of the “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” rule, the Court completely changed the 
appraisal landscape, stating that appraisers “must always consider causation, at 
least as an initial matter. An appraisal is for damages caused by a specific 
occurrence, not every repair a home might need.”121 The opinion has been a 
disaster, according to some commentators. This has produced a result sought by 
neither insurers nor insureds, making the appraisal process now a minefield of 
confusion, added cost, additional litigation, additional delay, and uncertainty: 
Johnson’s broad language does a disservice to insurers and insureds. Instead 
of limiting the reasoning in Johnson to the facts in the summary judgment 
record, the Texas Supreme Court went far beyond the facts to permit futile 
exercises which needlessly complicate and increase the cost of a claim and 
ultimately litigation.122 
With this background and with an appreciation for why appellate court 
treatment of appraisal was relatively rare for decades, we now note an opinion 
from the survey year in the aftermath of Johnson and In re: Universal Underwriters. 
In In re Guideone Mutual Insurance Company, in a truly remarkable conclusion, 
waiver did not occur where the insurer invoked appraisal “several years after 
litigation commenced and two months before a trial setting.”123 
The court stated that 
[The insured] contends it has been prejudiced because it incurred litigation 
expenses due to [the insurer’s] delay before invoking the appraisal process. 
Over a period of several years, the parties engaged in the discovery process, 
answering written discovery, taking deposition, and disclosing experts. The 
expenses [the insured] incurred developing its case included approximately 
$10,000 in expert fees for accounting services and over $100,000 in 
attorney fees. Nevertheless, the mandamus record does not establish that these 
expenses would not have been incurred if [the insurer] had moved for appraisal 
earlier.124 
Perhaps this is what the court in Universal Underwriters meant in saying “it is 
difficult to see how prejudice could ever be shown.”125 
 
 120. Id. at 889. 
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 125. Universal, 345 S.W.3d at 412. No waiver was also the result in In re Texas Windstorm 
Insurance Association, No. 14-13-00632-CV, 2013 WL 4806996, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
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The author predicts that a considerable amount of attention by the insurance 
industry, consumer advocates, the Texas Department of Insurance, and the 
Texas legislature will be focused on appraisal sooner, rather than later. The use, 
and misuse, of the process is now common. The process is working to the 
benefit of no one. There are no rules, no standards, no ethical guidelines—just a 
wild, wild west sort of chaos. Clip on a shiny badge and you can be the sheriff! 
Changes are in order. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The expansion of mediation and arbitration and the increase in the use of the 
appraisal process are evidence that our civil justice system remains broken. Our 
courthouses are imperfect forums; the litigation process is so slow, so expensive, 
and so inefficient as to be irrelevant to many. But with the steady increase in the 
use of alternative methods of dispute resolution comes an increase in the 
concerns and the controversies over how these alternatives are evolving. We may 
have reached the saturation point with mediation. The unexpected proposed 
rule change in the survey year to scale back judicial discretion to order parties to 
mediate may have been a way to send an “enough is enough” message. We seem 
obsessed with mediation to the point that virtually every pending lawsuit in 
most jurisdictions around the state is ordered to mediation at least once, even 
over the objections of the parties. Is this the vision of mediation that sponsors 
and promoters of the ADR statute had in 1987? It is doubtful. That today’s 
advocates often prefer to skip the “joint session” at the outset of mediation, 
something almost unthinkable in the practice of mediation twenty years ago, 
might be a sign that too much mediation sometimes results in a mechanical 
approach to the process. 
Even more controversy swirls around arbitration, especially in the consumer 
and employment contexts. Sometimes it now seems that courts are too willing to 
acquiesce in allowing arbitration to be imposed on the unknowing and 
unwilling through the wide use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses, regardless of 
how adhesive these “agreements” truly are. 
In the world of commercial arbitration, many have voiced the opinion that 
arbitration has become “The New Litigation,” more expensive, more time-
consuming, and more inefficient than litigation.126 
How did we get to this point, and where is the use of ADR headed? One 
thing is certain about ADR: it may be evolving, but it is not going away. 
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